Abstract. Let N = pq be an RSA modulus and e be a public exponent. Numerous attacks on RSA exploit the arithmetical properties of the key equation ed − k(p − 1)(q − 1) = 1. In this paper, we study the more general equation eu − (p − s)(q − r)v = w. We show that when the unknown integers u, v, w, r and s are suitably small and p − s or q − r is factorable using the Elliptic Curve Method for factorization ECM, then one can break the RSA system. As an application, we propose an attack on Demytko's elliptic curve cryptosystem. Our method is based on Coppersmith's technique for solving multivariate polynomial modular equations.
Introduction
In 1976, Diffie and Hellman [6] invented the concept of the public-key cryptosystem. Since then, various schemes have been proposed as public-key cryptosystems.
In 1978, Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman [22] proposed RSA, the most widely used public-key cryptosystem. The public parameters in RSA are the modulus N = pq and the public exponent e satisfying gcd(e, (p − 1)(q − 1)) = 1 where p, q are large prime numbers of the same bit-size. The decryption exponent is the integer d such that ed ≡ 1 (mod (p − 1)(q − 1)).
In 1985, Koblitz [13] and Miller [20] independently suggested the use of elliptic curves in cryptography, mainly for the Diffie-Hellman [6] key exchange protocol and the El Gamal cryptosystem [7] . Let p > 3 be a prime number and a, b be two integers such that gcd(4a 3 + 27b 2 , p) = 1. The elliptic curve E p (a, b) over the field F p is the set of points P = (x, y) such that y 2 ≡ x 3 + ax + b (mod p) together with the point at infinity. The number of points in E p (a, b) is #E p (a, b) = p + 1 − t p where t p is an integer satisfying the Hasse bound |t p | ≤ 2 √ p. Elliptic curves can be extended over the ring Z/nZ where n is a composite integer. Such elliptic curves can serve to find small prime factors of n as in the Elliptic Curve Method (ECM) for factorization [15] . In 1994, Demytko [5] developed a cryptosystem using an elliptic curve E N (a, b) over the ring Z/N Z where N = pq is an RSA modulus. In the Demytko system, the public parameters are N , a, b together with a public exponent e satisfying gcd e, p 2 − t 2 p q 2 − t 2 q = 1. The decryption exponent is an integer d satisfying ed ≡ 1 (mod lcm(p + 1 ± t p , q + 1 ± t q )) where t p = p + 1 − #E p (a, b) and t q = q + 1 − #E q (a, b).
The RSA cryptosystem is deployed in many commercial systems for providing privacy and authenticity. If RSA is deployed in a device with small computing power, it is desirable to use a small public exponent e or a small private exponent d. Unfortunately, in 1990, Wiener [25] showed that RSA is insecure if d < . In 1999, Boneh and Durfee [3] improved this bound up to d < N 0.292 . Their method is based on Coppersmith's method [4] for solving modular polynomial equations and uses the RSA key equation ed − k(p − 1)(q − 1) = 1. Afterwards, many attacks on RSA or variants of RSA have been presented using Coppersmith's method or other techniques (see [11] , [19] , [2] ).
In this paper, using a variant RSA equation, we present a new attack on RSA by combining Coppersmith's method and the Elliptic Curve Method for factorization ECM. Let B be a positive integer. An integer n is said to be B-smooth if all prime factors are less than B. We say that B is an efficiency bound for ECM if every prime factor less than B of an integer n can be found by ECM.
Suppose that the public exponent e = N β satisfies a variant equation of the form eu − (p − s)(q − r)v = w with suitably small unknown integers 0 < u < N δ , 0 < v, |w| < N γ , |r| < N α and |s| < N α with α < . We show that the RSA modulus N = pq can be factored under two conditions. The first condition is that p − s is B-smooth for some efficiency bound B of ECM and the second condition is that δ satisfies the following inequality
where ε is a small positive constant. Our method is based on combining Coppersmith's method and ECM. We use Coppersmith's method to find the small solutions (u, v, w, (p − s)(q − r)) of the equation eu − (p − s)(q − r)v = w and ECM to factor (p − s)(q − r) and to extract the value of p − s from the B-smooth part of (p − s)(q − r). Finally reusing Coppersmith's method, we can find p from the value of p − s.
We apply the new method to present a new attack on Demytko's scheme. In this scheme, the public exponent e and the private exponent d satisfy one of the four modular equations ed ≡ 1 (mod lcm(p + 1 ± t p , q + 1 ± t q )). This gives rise to an equation of the form eu − (p + 1 ± t p )(q + 1 ± t q )v = w. Let e = N β . Suppose that |u| < N δ , 0 < v, |w| < N γ , |t p | < N α and |t q | < N α with α < 1 4 and that p + 1 ± t p or q + 1 ± t q is B-smooth. Then applying the new method as for RSA, one can factor the RSA modulus N = pq.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review Coppersmith's method, the theory of elliptic curves, Demytko's elliptic curve cryptosystem and the Elliptic Curve Method ECM for factorization. In Section 3, we present the new attack on RSA, and in Section 4, we present the new attack on Demytko's scheme. We conclude in Section 5.
Preliminaries
The following classical result is useful for the proof of our new attack (see [21] ).
Lemma 2.1. Let N = pq be an RSA modulus with q < p < 2q. Then √ 2 2
Coppersmith's method
In 1996, Coppersmith [4] describes a technique to find small modular roots of univariate polynomials and small integer roots of bivariate polynomials. This method has been extended to more variables and has many surprising results in cryptanalysis. A typical example is the following result [18] . Theorem 2.2 (Coppersmith) . Let N = pq be an RSA modulus with q < p < 2q. Let S be an approximation of an unknown multiple pr of p with r = q and |pr − S| < N Let h(x, y, z) ∈ Z[x, y, z] be a polynomial with ω monomials of the form
The Euclidean norm of h(x, y, z) is defined as
Under some conditions, a modular polynomial equation can be solved over the integers as presented in the following result [12] . To find polynomials with small coefficients that can be used in Howgrave-Graham's Theorem 2.3, Coppersmith's method uses a lattice and a lattice reduction algorithm such as the LLL algorithm [16] . This reduction algorithm can be applied to find a basis of lattice vectors with relatively small norms (see [18] ). 
Under the condition of Howgrave-Graham's Theorem, some modular polynomial equations derived from the reduced basis can be transformed to polynomial equations over the integers. For multivariate modular equations, solving the system of these polynomials is heuristic and depends on some extra assumptions such as the following one. Assumption 1. Let h 1 , h 2 , h 3 ∈ Z[x, y, z] be the polynomials that are found by Coppersmith's method. Then the ideal generated by the polynomial equations h 1 (x, y, z) = 0, h 2 (x, y, z) = 0, h 3 (x, y, z) = 0 has dimension zero.
Under this assumption, a system of polynomials sharing the root can be solved by using Gröbner basis computation or resultant techniques (see [1] for more details).
Elliptic curves
Let N = pq be an RSA modulus and let a and b be two integers such that gcd(4a
is the set of points (x, y) such that
together with the point at infinity O. It is well known that chord-and-tangent method in the case of elliptic curves E p (a, b) defined over the finite filed F p still hold for E n (a, b) unless the inversion of a non-zero number Q does not exist modulo N . This case would lead to find a factor of N by computing gcd(Q, N ). When the prime factors p, q in N = pq are large, then with overwhelming probability the inversion of a non-zero number will exist modulo N . Let p be a prime number. Under modulo p, the cardinality of E p (a, b) is denoted #E p (a, b) and satisfies the following result (see [24] , p. 131). Theorem 2.5 (Hasse). The order of an elliptic curve E p (a, b) over F p is given by
When the prime number p and the elliptic curve E p (a, b) are given, one can find the value of t p using computational methods such the Schoof-Elkies-Atkin algorithm (SEA) (see [23] ). Conversely, let p be a prime number and t an integer with |t| < 2 √ p. Let H(d) denote the Kronecker class number (see Section 1.6 of [15] ). Deuring's theory of CM-elliptic curves implies that there are H(t 2 − 4p) elliptic curves on Z/pZ having p + 1 − t points. Note that when |t| < √ p, H(t 2 − 4p) satisfies the following inequalities (see Proposition 1.9 of [15] )
where c 1 and c 2 are effectively computable positive constants. This shows that the number of elliptic curves with known cardinality is non negligible. Let p be a prime number and E p (a, b) be an elliptic curve with equation
where c is a fixed quadratic non-residue modulo p. Then the cardinality of
Demytko's elliptic curve cryptosystem
In 1994, Demytko [5] proposed a new cryptosystem defined over the field Z/N Z where N = pq is an RSA modulus such that p ≡ q ≡ 2 (mod 3). Demytko's scheme uses fixed integers a and b and a fixed modulus N . Demytko's scheme uses only the x-coordinate of a point P = (x, y) ∈ E N (a, b) to compute a multiple eP ∈ E N (a, b) (see Lemma 2 in [14] ). Demytko's scheme can be summarized as follows.
Key Generation:
• Choose two distinct prime numbers p and q of similar bit-length.
• Compute N = pq.
• Select two integers a, b < p such that gcd n, 4a 3 + 27b 2 = 1.
• Choose e such that gcd e, p 2 − t 
Encryption:
• Transform the message m as the x-coordinate of a point P = (m x , m y ) on the elliptic curve E N (a, b).
• Compute the ciphertext point C = eP = (c x , c y ) = e(m x , m y ) on the elliptic curve
• Compute m as the x-coordinate of dC = deP = P = (m x , m y ) on the elliptic curve
A variant of Demytko's scheme is to consider d ≡ e −1 (mod (p + 1 ± t p , q + 1 ± t q )) instead of modulo lcm(p + 1 ± t p , q + 1 ± t q ). Then e and d satisfy an equation of the form
This equation matches the RSA variant key equation that will be studied in this paper.
The Elliptic Curve Method
An integer m is said to be B-smooth if all the prime factors of m are less than or equal to B. Smooth numbers are used in cryptography by many factoring and discrete logarithm algorithms (see [15] and [17] ). The counting function of B-smooth numbers in an interval [1, x] is defined as
In the particular case x = B u , Hildebrand [10] gave the asymptotic formula ψ(x, B) = xρ(u) where ρ(u) is the Dikman rho-function defined as the solution of the differential equation uρ (u) = −ρ(u − 1) for u ≥ 1 with the initial condition ρ(u) = 1 for 0 ≤ u ≤ 1. For 1 ≤ u ≤ 2, the Dikman function satisfies ρ(u) = 1 − log u so that ψ(x, B) = x(1 − log u). The Elliptic Curve method (ECM) is a probabilistic method for integer factorization and was discovered by H.W. Lenstra [15] 
Suppose that the order of E (Z/p e1 1 Z) is B-smooth and let m be a multiple of |E (Z/p e1 1 Z)|, typically m = lcm(2, . . . , B). Then, for every P ∈ E (Z/nZ), we have mP = (0 : 1 : 0) (mod p 1 ). Consequently, computing mP where P ∈ E (Z/nZ), using the addition formulas on E (Z/nZ), we must get mP = (x : y : z) = (0 : 1 : 0) (mod p 1 ). This implies that z ≡ 0 (mod p 1 ) and that gcd(z, n) = p r 1 for some positive integer r which will reveal p 1 .
The Attack on RSA
In this section, we present an attack on RSA when the public key (N, e) satisfies an equation eu − (p − s)(q − r)v = w with suitably small parameters u, v, w, r, s under the condition that one of the factors (p − s) or (q − r) is B-smooth for some ECM-efficiency bound B.
3.1. The attack Theorem 3.1. Let N = pq be an RSA modulus and e = N β be a public exponent. Suppose that e satisfies the equation eu
where ε is a small positive constant, then, under assumption (1), one can find (p − s)(q − r) in polynomial time.
Proof. Suppose that N = pq is an RSA modulus and e is a public exponent satisfying eu
, which can be rewritten as v(pr+qs−rs)−N v−w ≡ 0 (mod e). Consider the polynomial f (x, y, z) = xy − N x + z, Then (x, y, z) = (v, pr + qs − rs, −w) is a solution of the modular polynomial equation f (x, y, z) ≡ 0 (mod e). The small solutions of this modular equation can be found by applying Coppersmith's method [4] . Let m and t be two positive integers. Consider the polynomials
Let L denote the lattice spanned by the coefficient vectors of the polynomials G k,i1,i2,i3 (Xx, Y y, Zz) and H k,i1,i2,i3 (Xx, Y y, Zz). We can get a left triangular matrix if the ordering of the rows follows the ordering of the k's and the ordering of the the monomials of a polynomial follows the natural ordering following the i 1 's, then the i 2 's, then the i 3 's. Hence, using the triangular form of the matrix, the determinant of L is in the form det(L) = e ne X n X Y n Y Z n Z . For m = 2 and t = 1, the coefficient matrix for L is presented in Table 1 . The non-zero elements are marked with an ' '. (1)
Let t = τ m for some positive τ to be optimized later. The dominant terms of the exponents in (1) are
Applying the LLL algorithm 2.4 to the lattice L, we get a reduced basis where the three first vectors h i , i = 1, 2, 3 satisfy
To apply Howgrave-Graham's Theorem 2.3 to h 1 , h 2 and h 3 , we set 2 ω(ω−1)
This can be transformed to
or equivalently
Suppose that e = N β , 0 < u < N δ , |w| < N γ and max(|r|, |s|) < N α < N 
This gives
Using 0 < v and |w| < eu < N β+δ , we get
2 +α and Z = N γ . Then the target solution (x, y, z) satisfies |x| < X, |y| < Y and |z| < Z. Using the approximations of n e , n X , n Y , n Z and ω given in (2), the inequality (3) can be transformed into (3τ + 2)β + (3τ + 2)(β + δ − 1) + 3τ
where ε 1 collects all constant terms in e, X, Y and Z. It is a small positive constant that depends only on N . The optimal value for τ is
and, plugging this value in the former inequality, we obtain
where ε 2 is another small positive constant. The former equation is valid for
where ε is a small positive constant. Under this condition, the LLL algorithm applied to the lattice L outputs three vectors v i , i = 1, 2, 3. These vectors represent the coefficients of three polynomials h i (Xx, Y y, Zz), i = 1, 2, 3 sharing the root (x, y, z) = (v, pr + qs + rs, −w). Then, applying Gröbner basis computations, we get the expected solution, from which we deduce (p − s)(q − r) = N − (pr + qs + rs). Since all the former steps can be done in polynomial time, then the method is a polynomial time algorithm. This terminates the proof. 3 . This retrieves the classical bound on the private exponent d (see [3] ). Theorem 3.2. Let N = pq be an RSA modulus and e = N β be a public exponent. Suppose that e satisfies the equation eu − (p − s)(q − r)v = w with |r|, |s| < N α < N 1 4 , 0 < u < N δ , 0 < v and |w| < N γ . Let B be an ECM-efficiency bound for the Elliptic Curve Method. If (p − s) or (q − r) is B-smooth and
then, under assumption (1), one can find p and q in polynomial time.
Proof. Suppose that, in the equation eu − (p − s)(q − r)v = w, the parameters satisfy |r|, |s| < N α < N 1 4 , e = N β , 0 < u < N δ , < v, |w| < N γ and that the exponent parameters satisfy δ < (2α + 1)(2α + 6β − 6γ + 1) − ε. Then, by applying Theorem 3.1, we can find the exact value of (p − s)(q − r). Next, suppose that (p − s) is B-smooth where B is a bound for the efficiency of the Elliptic Curve Method (ECM). Hence, ECM will reveal a partial factorization of (p − s)(q − r) as
were ω((p − s)(q − r) is the number of distinct prime factors of (p − s)(q − r) less than B and M is such that M = 1 or all prime factors of M are greater than B. The average order of the number of prime factors of an integer n is ω(n) ≈ log n log log n (see [9] , pp. 355). Since |r|, |s| < N α and
Hence, the average number of the prime factors of (p − s)(q − r) satisfies
On the other hand, according to the factorization
the number of distinct divisors of p − s is exactly
(e i + 1). However, the average number of divisors of an integer n is log n (see Theorem 319 of [9] ). Hence, the average number of divisors of
Using (5), we get
The former inequalities can be solved by applying linear programming algorithms such as PSLQ [8] and LLL [16] , and using a solution (x 1 , . . . , x ω(p−s) ), we compute d = 
A numerical example for RSA
We experimented our method with various sizes. In all cases, the assumption (1) was true and the method was successful to find the factorization of the RSA modulus.
As a numerical example, consider the following RSA 265 bit-size modulus N with the public exponent e, N =431152655066872264361967287569597072664021583942612947594581 39340520129183826747, e =442910968337832163537316435435954401939549665933793683113289
7706681971178351139.
Suppose that N = pq with unknown factorization and e satisfies an equation eu − (p − s)(q − r)v = w with the suitably small unknown parameters u, v, w, r and s. Then applying the method of Theorem 3.1 to solve the equation eu − (p − s)(q − r)v = w, with the bounds
Since (p − s)(q − r) = N − (pr + qs − rs), we get
3819094510831187730169600.
Then, using the Elliptic Curve Method with the bound B = N 1 10 ≈ 91931238, we get the factorization
Using the factorization of (p − s)(q − r), we can find the set of the factors d such that 
Application to Demytko's Scheme
In this section, we show how to apply the technique of Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 to break the Demytko scheme in some situations and provide a numerical example.
The attack on Demytko's Scheme
In Demytko's scheme, the RSA modulus is N = pq and the elliptic curve E N (a, b) is such that #E p (a, b) = p+1−t p and #E q (a, b) = q +1−t q where, according to Hasse Theorem, |t p | < 2 √ p and |t q | < 2 √ q. Also, the public exponent e and the private exponent d satisfy one of the four
These equations can be transformed into one of the form eu−(p−s)(q−r)v = w where s = ∓t p −1 and t = ∓t q − 1, which can be studied using the technique of Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2. 
, 0 < u < N δ , < v and |w| < N γ . Let B be an ECM-efficiency bound for the Elliptic Curve Method. If p + 1 ± t p or q + 1 ± t q is B-smooth and
Proof. Since the equation eu − (p + 1 ± t p )(q + 1 ± t q )v = w can be transformed into eu − (p − s)(q − r)v = w with s = ∓t p − 1 and t = ∓t q − 1, then this equation can be solved under the conditions of Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 when |t p − 1| < N α and |t q − 1| < N α .
A numerical example for Demytko
Let us consider the Demytko public parameters (N, e, a, b) where N is an 510-bit RSA modulus 
Conclusion
In this paper, we consider an instance of RSA where the public exponent satisfies a generalized key equation with many unknown parameters. Under suitable conditions, we combine Coppersmith's method and the Elliptic Curve Method for factorization ECM, we solve the equation and find the prime factors of the RSA modulus. We apply the same technique to launch an attack on Demytko's Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem when the secret parameters are suitably small.
